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follow the basic rule of timely assertion."
However, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit substantially departed from these prin-
ciples in United States v. Asendio.6 The de-
fendant, without exceptional circumstances
present, was entitled to a new trial despite a
failure to move for suppression of the illegally
seized evidence before trial.
The Asendio ruling would allow a defendant
to gamble on the effect of the seized evidence,
and then to attack it. This is a minority view;
clearly in majority practice the "seasonable
objection" principle remains strongly en-
trenched and only permits the defendant to
protect his rights without harassing the judicial
system or unduly hampering law enforcement
officers. In all events, since the exclusionary
rule is in itself an exception, it appears the
courts are justifiably strict when applying it
to strike out competent evidence.
63 See Peters v. United States, 97 F.2d 500 (9th
Cir. 1938); Brink v. United States, 60 F.2d 231
(6th Cir. 1932), cerl. denied, 287 U.S. 667 (1932);
Durkin v. United States, 62 F.2d 305 (lst Cir.
1932).
6 171 F.2d 122 (3rd Cir. 1948).
CONCLUSION
Substantively, federal law of search and
seizure is gradually deviating from earlier
liberal decisions involving the constitutional
protection. While lip service is paid to principles
which preclude seizure of articles solely for
evidentiary purposes and which sanction seizure
only of articles particularly described in a
search warrant, the courts are able to avoid
these principles by loosely designating the
character of the seized articles as public or as
instrumentalities of crime. This is particularly
accomplished in conjunction with a search and
seizure justified as incident to lawful arrest.
The courts have been consistent only in the
area of the. Silverthorne rule respecting indirect
and derivative use of unreasonably seized
evidence.
Procedurally, the tendency is to reaffirm the
limitations of standing and seasonable objec-
tion, but at the same time the courts appear to
be more receptive to liberal interpretations and
bona fide exceptions so as to afford the ag-
grieved defendant greater opportunities to
assert his constitutional rights. The Jeffcrs
and Asendio holdings foreshadow this trend.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Testimony of Witness Before Congressional
Hearing Cannot Be Used Against Him in Any
State or Federal Criminal Proceeding-In
response to a summons by the Senate Commit-
tee investigating crime, petitioner appeared
and confessed to running a gambling business
in Maryland. This confession was used to
secure his conviction, in a state court, of
violating Maryland's anti-lottery statutes. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner claimed
that the use of this testimony was barred by
Federal law providing that no testimony given
by a witness in congressional inquiries "shall
be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
against him in any court .... ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486 (1946). In opposition the state argued
that this law was inapplicable because the
petitioner did not claim the privilege against
self-incrimination or, in the alternative, that
the testimony was barred only in federal
courts and, finally, that congress lacks the
power to exclude such evidence from state
courts. A unanimous Court overruled all three
of the state's contentions and reversed the
conviction. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954). The Court reasoned that to construe the
statute as requiring the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment would leave section 3486 with no
effect whatever. As to the second contention
the Court ruled that "any court" was language
plain enough. The last argument was summarily
dismissed as being clearly within the "necessary
I
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and proper" clause of Article 1 of the Con-
stitution.
Defendant's Being Placed on Trial a Second
Time Held Not to Constitute Double Jeopardy
-Petitioner and Cook and Matthews were
arrested for assault with a deadly weapon. The
latter two were tried first and found guilty.,
While their case was pending appeal, petitioner
was placed on trial. When Cook and Matthews
were asked, as witnesses for the state, to
corroborate their pre-indictment statement that
petitioner helped them plan the assault, they
claimed the self-incrimination privilege. The
trial court upheld their claim and then granted
the prosecution's motion for mistrial and con-
tinuance until final disposition of Cook's and
Matthew's appeal. After their conviction was
affirmed-thus ending their self-incrimination
risks-petitioner was brought to trial again.
He objected that such action constituted
double jeopardy and thus denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction. Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424 (1953). (Of course the question of
whether this procedure would be double
jeopardy within the Fifth Amendment was not
raised here because the Fifth Amendment
applies only to federal prosecutions. Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. The Court said due
process was not denied because the procedure
here did not violate those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions." Moreover, the Court favors the rule
giving the trial judge discretion to declare a
mistrial and try the defendant again if the
rules of justice will be best served.
In vigorous dissent, the late Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson argued the action was contrary
to the scheme of "ordered justice" and hence a
denial of due process. One of the dissent's
strongest points is the assertion that under the
results reached by the majority a state is free,
if the prosecution thinks a conviction probably
cannot be won on the testimony at the trial,
to stop the trial and insist that it be tried again
another day when there are stronger men on the
field.
Where Conviction Is Overruled Because of
Failure to Permit Defendant to Poll Jury,
Subsequent Re-trial Does Not Constitute
Double Jeopardy-Counsel for defendant was
not in the courtroom when the jury returned but
he had left instructions where he would be and
that he should be called when the jury returned.
He was not so notified and thus could not poll
the jury when they returned a guilty verdict.
Since a statute provided for the right to poll
the jury, the conviction was reversed by the
trial court and a new trial ordered. Defendant
appealed, claiming that a new trial would sub-
ject him to double jeopardy. The court over-
ruled this contention. Allen v. State, 70 So.2d
644 (Ala. 1954). When a judgment of convic-
tion is reversed for a mere irregularity, not
going to its validity, an appeal by the defendant
causing a reversal does not entitle him to his
discharge as having once been in jeopardy.
Where Public Officer Solicits Illegal Sale
Defendant Is Entitled to Instruction on En-
trapment-A federal narcotics officer purchased
heroin from defendant. Defendant claimed
entrapment based on the theory of Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) that "when
the criminal design originates, not with the
accused, but is conceived in the mind of the
government officers, and the accused is by
persuasion... or inducement lured into the
commission of a criminal act, the government
is estopped by public policy from prosecution."
But, the instant court points out, there is a
corollary to this rule; namely, that there can
be no entrapment if the defendant was already
disposed to such wrongdoing and awaiting
only an advantageous and apparently safe
opportunity. Thus, in reversing, the court
held there was a jury question whether the
defendant was disposed to trade in narcotics
or whether he yielded to importunations con-
trary to his own inclination. United States v.
Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1954).
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Conviction Cannot Be Upheld Solely on an
Extrajudicial Confession Unless It Is Cor-
roborated by Other Proof of the Corpus
Delicti-In Masse v. United States, 210 F.2d
419 (5th Cir. 1954), petitioner appealed from
conviction of violating the Mann Act. At the
trial the government introduced into evidence
the confession Masse had made when he was
apprehended and other evidence which tended
to show that Masse had transported a woman
across state lines for immoral purposes and
that he had had illicit relationships with her.
In affirming, the Court stated the prevalent
rule that guilt cannot be proved by the extra-
judicial confession of the defendant unless
corroborated by proof aliunde of the corpus
delicti. However, full, direct and positive
evidence of the corpus delicti is not indis-
pensable. Thus a confession will be sufficient if
there is such extrinsic corroborative circum-
stances as will, when taken in connection with
the confession, establish guilt beyond reason-
able doubt. The court ruled that a sufficient
amount of this type of evidence was present.
Defendant Who Voluntarily Takes the Stand
May Be Cross-examined Over His Failure to
Make Statement to Arresting Officer-Im-
mediately after his arrest on an abortion
charge, defendant was asked if he had any-
thing to say about the charge. He said he had
no statement. During trial defendant took the
stand on his own behalf and upon cross-
examination he was asked why he made no
statement at the time of his arrest. On appeal
from conviction defendant contended this
questioning violated the self-incrimination
privilege. While the court reversed on other
grounds, it did deny this argument. Peckham v.
United Stales, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
The rule is well established that when a de-
fendant takes the stand in his own defense he
may be cross-examined about his failure
to testify on his previous trial for the same
offense. Implicit in this rule, the court rea-
soned, is the right to cross-examine a deferidant
about his failure to seek to exonerate himself
when questioned on a previous occasion. Cer-
tainly if the former does not invade the protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment neither does the
latter.
The Constitutional Right of Confrontation
May Be Waived-The defendant and eight
others were indicted for attempt to commit
murder. Defendant. was granted a separate
trial; the others were tried first and four .were
found guilty by a jury. Cruzado waived trial
by jury and when he came before the same
judge he agreed to the following stipulation.
It was agreed that the case against Cruzado
should be submitted to the judge upon the
evidence introduced by the prosecution and
by the defense at the earlier trial against his
cb-defendants, including the entire cross-
examination and redirect examination of each of
the witnesses for both sides. The judge ap-
proved the stipulation and found the defendant
Cruzado guilty. On appeal Cruzado argued
that the Sixth Amendment had been offended
because he was deprived of the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."
The conviction was affirmed. Cruzado v. Puterto
Rico, 210 F.2d 789 (lst Cir. 1954). Judge
Magruder reasoned, first, that the principal
advantage of the riglit of confrontation is that
it affords the opportunity to subject the
prosecution witnesses to cross-examination.
Since the accused can forego cross-examination
it ought to follow that he can waive the right
altogether. Another basis for the right of con-
frontation is that it aids the trier of fact in
determining the credibility of witnesses, by
observing their demeanor while testifying.
Here, however, the same trier of fact did have
the opportunity to observe the witnesses. But,
even apart from the last fact, the court con-
cluded -that the right to confrontation is
waivable and here it was so waived.
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